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   If recently declassified documents from the Soviet Bloc are to be believed, there was no Somalia-Ethiopia conflict in 1977. Truly, it was a Somalia vs Cuba/USSR. Before the Soviet Bloc decided to intervene, Somalia had, to borrow a favorite Ethiopian phrase, taught Ethiopia a lesson it would not forget. The 5,000 strong Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia–with help from their brethren in Somalia–had routed the Ethiopian army decisively. It was only after the Soviet bloc, specifically Cuba had, in the words of Castro, decided on “massive intervention” that the tides turned.Â
In this essay, you will see that the Ethiopian Government’s habit of:
* asking foreigners to fight its wars
* assembling heads of mission to tell fantastic tales * employing its press to “teach ____ an unforgetable lesson ____ won’t forget”
* the goodwill of the other party not to fire the first shot is an invitation to attack
* the shifting pre-conditions for peace is well-documented. Read and draw whatever lessons you will from it.
In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Bloc was confronted with the issue of two allies in the Horn of Africa about to have border skirmishes. There was a great deal of hand-wringing about whether to support Somalia or Ethiopia. There were many attempts to mediate the conflict by using the ‘good offices’ of Yemen, Cuba, and the Soviet Union—all to no avail.  The final decision to support Ethiopia was primarily due to Cuban Fidel Castro’s assessment of Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam and Somalia’s Siad Barre.
On Sunday, April 3, 1977, Cuban President Fidel Castro, briefed a group of German officials, including Erich Honecker, leader of East Germany about his recent visit to Somalia and Ethiopia and the subsequent meeting in Aden, Yemen, by Mengistu, Barre, and Yemen’s Rubayi Ali to resolve the border conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia:
(1) FIDEL CASTRO’S ASSESSMENT OF SIAD BARRE:
“Siad Barre was very arrogant and severe; maybe he wanted to intimidate us….I asked him whether he felt that there had been no real revolution in Ethiopia and that Mengistu was not a real leftist leader. He told me that there had been no revolution in Ethiopia. While in Mogadishu he had shown me a map of Greater Somalia in which half of Ethiopia had been annexed…I have made up my mind about Siad Barre, he is above all a chauvinist…Socialism is just an outer shell that is supposed to make him more attractive.
“…Siad Barre really thinks that he is at the summit of wisdom. Until now everything has gone smoothly for him. The Italians and the British made him a general. The revolution was accomplished in a minute, with hardly a shot fired. He put on a socialist face and got economic aid and weapons from Soviet Union…Barre is very convinced of himself. His socialist rhetoric is unbearable. He is the greatest socialist; he cannot say ten words without mentioning socialism.”
(2) FIDEL CASTRO’S ASSESSMENT OF MENGISTU HAILEMARIAM:
“The next day I flew to Ethiopia…The day of my arrival there were rumors of a coup. It did not happen…In February, our study delegation, after inspecting the army divisions, had determined that of the hundreds of generals, all but two should be chased out…Mengistu strikes me as a quiet, serious, and sincere leader who is aware of the power of the masses. He is an intellectual personality who showed his wisdom on 3 February. The rightist wanted to do away with the leftists on 3 February. The prelude to this was an exuberant speech by the Ethiopian president in favor of nationalism. Mengistu preempted the coup. He called the meeting of the Revolutionary Council one hour early and had the rightist leaders arrested and shot. A very consequential decision was taken on 3 February.”
From that day on, the Soviet Bloc makes a critical decision to support Ethiopia and starve out Somalia. The rest is history….here are the highlights:
MAY-JUNE 1977:Â Somalian Vice President Mohammed Ali Samanta, on a visit to the Soviet Union, assures his hosts that “the Somali leadership would not on its own initiative unleash an armed conflict with Ethiopia.”
JULY 1977: The Cuban military specialists Division General, Arnold Ochoa, briefs the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia, A.N. Ratanov, on why the Ethiopian Government suffered a military defeat in its conflicts with Somalia. Ethiopia had “overestimated its own military capabilities” and there was “military incompetence of the officer corps and conservatism.” Ethiopia’s armed forces consisted of 6 divisions of the regular army (55 thousand ), 8 divisions of the people’s militia (about 100,000) and police formations (40 thousand people.) In Ogaden, the detachments of the Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia consisted of 5 thousand people. The Somalis had engaged Ethiopia in combat near the cities of Hara, Jijiga, Gode, Dire Dawa. Ochoa recommends providing Ethiopia with helicopters, trucks and to create food, medicine and fuel reserves.
JULY 25 – JULY 26 1977: The Somali Delegation of Experts, headed by H.A. Kasim, arrives in Moscow to discuss the border war with Ethiopia. Kasim says that “the changing of the name byssinia to Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Empire to Socialist Ethiopia did not change in the slightest degree the state of affiairs.” The war is “between Ethiopia and the liberation movement of the Somali people who live in the occupied territory. The struggle is being conducted precisely by this movement, and not by the Somali Democratic Republic.”
JULY 29, 1977: Mengistu Hailemariam, Chairman of PMAC, in response to the Soviet Ambassador’s question regarding the “strutructure of the Ethiopian armed forces”, says: “We are attentive to the advice of our Soviet comrades…and have already been required to execute many persons or place them in prison.”
August 12-18, 1977: Somalia’s Head of Delegation of Experts, H.A. Kasim, tells the Soviet Union (Ilichev) that “Ethiopia has come forward with rather resolute declarations in the press and on the radio to the effect that ETHIOPIA INTENTS TO TEACH SOMALIA A LESSON WHICH SOMALIA WILL NEVER FORGET.” Kasim goes on to state that “Cuban military officials are involved in the conflict between the Western Somali Liberation Front and Ethiopia.” And expressed alarm at the “avalanche of declarations and commentary appearing in the Soviet press.”
August 23, 1977: The Cuban ambassador to Ethiopia, Jose Perez Novoa, apologizes to the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ratanov, for an inappropriate remark that Arnold Ochoa, the leader of the Cuban military specialists in Ethiopia made. Ochoa had said, “the decision to send Cuban personnel to Ethiopia does not depend on Havana, but on Moscow.”
September 3, 1977: The USA charge d’affairs in Ethiopia, Arthur Tienken, tells Soviet Ambassador Ratanov that the US had told Ethiopia that the US “does not and would not interfere in the domestic affairs of Ethiopia, including in Eritrea.” Moreover, “Tienkin is aware of the rumours that Israel is supposedly rendering military aid to Ethiopia.”
September 5, 1977: Mengistu and Berhanu Bayeh pay a visit to Soviet Ambassador Ratanov. Mengistu asks that the ambassador convey his appreciation to Brezhnev because thanks to “Soviet supplies of trailers for the transport of tanks, the balance of forces between Ethiopia and Somali was beginning to move in favor of Ethiopia.”
September 10, 1977: Mengistu invites the Soviet Bloc Head of Missions in Addis Ababa. In a meeting attended by Atnafu Abate (Deputy Chair of PMAC), Berhanu Bayeh (Permanent Member of PMAC) and Felleke Gdle-Giorgis (Minister of Foreign Affairs), the delegation is told that the PMAC has discovered “an imperialist plot against the Ethiopian revolution.” The conspirators included the USA, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kenya and Somalia.
November 8, 1977: In a “closed visit” to Moscow, Mengistu Haile Mariam briefs his hosts on the situation in the Horn of Africa. “The separatists succeeded in seizing the main cities of Eritrea, except for Asmara and the port of Massawa. Somali troops occupied in effect the whole Ogaden, with exception of Harar and Dire Dawa.”
December 6, 1977: Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ratanov, briefs an East German official on the border conflict. “The technical superiority of the Somali troops is most rominent in heavy artillery. Although the Ethiopian side has-due to Soviet deliveries-at its disposal over 510 heavy guns while Somalia has 126, there is a lack of soldiers who can handle the heavy artillery…300 Cuban military experts (artillery, tank drivers, pilots) are expected to arrive soon.”  Mengistu has “consolidated his position since the elimination of Atnafu Abate…The PMAC presently has about 80 members. 30 of them are a burden….Atnafu was criticized for problems which he rightfully brought up. He favored the development to a mixed society… Now nobody dares to say anything anymore.”
February 13, 1978: Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodrigues gives CC a report on the conflict in the Horn. “In close consultation with the Soviet comrades, Comrade Fidel Castro favored a massive intervention in the Ogaden against the Somali invasion…Comrade Castro refused to intervene in Eritrea…Now, a few days ago, Comrade Mengistu has asked again and spoke of a dramatic and dangerous development in the situation; again he demanded to have Cuban units deployed at the Eritrean front.”
Comrade Rodrigues tells his guests that “a large counter-offensive had been in preparation since 25 December 1977…Up to now, there have been only preparatory blows. Most of the units marked for action have not been deployed yet, and the main blow has not even yet begun…This means that by early March we can expect a great victory at this front.”
March 3, 1978: Comrade Pepe, Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia, briefs the East Germans on the Ogaden War. “Dire Dawa and Harar have been liberated…Regular Somali troops are ithdrawing to the border; they intend to leave guerrilla fighters in Jijiga as a bridgehead…The Issar and Afars are displaying good behavior; Issar in part fought on the side of the Ethiopians…At the request of the Cuban comrades, Mengistu spoke publicly about the presence of Soviet and Cuban advisers. [“Cuban military personnel took part in the military actions, while Soviet military advisors articipated in working out the plan of military operations.”] NEVERTHELESS, THE PRESS CONTINUALLY CLAIMS THAT ETHIOPIA IS STILL FIGHTING BY ITSELF. The reasons for this [is] unclear.”
March 13, 1978: GDR diplomat Eberhard Heinrich meets with Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade Ratanov.  Regarding Ethiopia’s hesitation to negotiate with Somalia, “…THE ETHIOPIAN POSITIONS COULD NOT WELL BE PRESENTED AS LOGICAL BEFORE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. AT FIRST ETHIOPIA DECLARES THAT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE IF SOMALIA WITHDRAWS ITS TROOPS. NOW THAT THEY
[THE SOMALIS] ARE WILLING TO DO SO, THE ETHIOPIANS ARE RETREATING FROM THEIR POSITION.”
April 3, 1978:Â An information sheet prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry CPSU CC International regarding the Somalia-Ethiopia war states that:
· Ethiopia received a great deal of help. “Cuban military personnel took part in the military actions, while Soviet military advisors participated in working out the plan of military operations.” Cuba sent “its own tank operators, artillery specialists, pilots, and also sub-units of mechanized infantry…During the Ethiopian counter-attack, CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE USED IN THE MAIN LINES OF ATTACK. The Soviet Union and Cuba are in constant contact aimed at coordination of their actions in support of the Ethiopian revolution.”
· Somali’s appeal for help from the Soviet bloc received “decisive refusal” The Soviet Bloc “brough deliveries of combat material, weapons, and ammunition to Somalia to a halt.”
· Siad Barre asked for help from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt but he was “not successful in getting their agreement to send their forces to that region”
· Yemen, Algeria and, “to an extent”, Libya “provided support to Ethiopia. Yemen sent “weapons and military personnel to Ethiopia.”
· The West has, “for a variety of reasons…not set out to provide Somalia with direct military assistance. Primarily, they did not want to decisively push Ethiopia away from them, counting on reestablishing their positions here in the future.”
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